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Recent accounts support the existence of two distinct feelings of guilt: altruistic guilt
(AG), arising from the appraisal of not having been altruistic toward a victim and
deontological guilt (DG), emerging from the appraisal of having violated an intuitive
moral rule. Neuroimaging data has shown that the two guilt feelings trigger different
neural networks, with DG selectively activating the insula, a brain area involved in the
processing of disgust and self-reproach. Thus, insula activation could reflect the major
involvement of self-reproach in DG rather than in AG. However, only a few studies have
empirically tested whether and how DG and AG differently affect decision making and
none have compared enhanced self-worth. Here we asked three groups of participants,
respectively, induced with either pride, DG or AG, to participate in a third-party version
of the ultimatum game in which they were asked to decide on behalf of others to accept
or reject economic offers with several degrees of fairness. Results revealed that only
deontological participants had higher median acceptances of Moderately Unfair offers
as compared to proud participants. However fairness judgments were not different
between groups, suggesting that deontological participants’ moral standards had not
decreased. Crucially, a higher increase in DG was associated with an increase in the
odds of accepting 30:70 offers. The opposite effects that DG and pride exert on self-
worth can account for these results. Specifically, proud participants felt entitled enough
to take action in order to restore equity, while deontological participants followed the
“Do not play God” principle, which limited their decisional autonomy, not allowing them
to decide on behalf of others.
Keywords: guilt, altruistic guilt, deontological guilt, pride, ultimatum game, “Do not play God” principle
Introduction
“Impious myself, and from an impious race.
Where is my splendor now?”
(Oedipus the King, Sophocles)
Traditional approaches to guilt tend to describe a unique emotion with speciﬁc situational and
psychological determinants, a precise behavioral drive and a clear evolutionary function. However,
diﬀerent models lead to diﬀerent explanations of the same emotional phenomenon, namely
guilt. According to the intrapsychic or psychoanalytic approach (Mosher, 1965, 1966; Lewis, 1971;
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Piers and Singer, 1971; Wertheim and Schwarz, 1983; Monteith,
1993), guilt is the emotional result of a conﬂict between our
interiorized moral authority and our behaviors (Fromm, 1985).
Its evolutionary function is to keep human behavior in line
with moral standards (Freud, 1959, 1961a,b). In this view,
guilt corresponds to the feeling of having disobeyed one’s own
inner moral values. This might cause an expectation or fear of
punishment (Wicker et al., 1983), the tendency to atone or the
will to apologize (Nelissen and Zeelenberg, 2009). The person
who feels guilty has the feeling of being a “bad person” (Lewis,
1971).
Conversely, following the interpersonal theory (Hoﬀman,
1981, 1987; Baumeister et al., 1994; Niedenthal et al., 1994;
Tangney, 1999; Tangney and Dearing, 2002; Ketelaar and
Au, 2003), guilt results from the awareness of having caused
unjustiﬁed harm to another or, in a more general sense, not
having behaved altruistically. This feeling is based on empathy
and compassion (Hoﬀman, 1981; Baumeister et al., 1994;
Niedenthal et al., 1994; O’Connor et al., 1999, 2000; Tangney,
1998). Here, the trigger is a suﬀering person, unjustly penalized,
who we did not help or did not even try to share his or her
pain. The evolutionary function of altruistic guilt (AG) is to
establish non-aggressive relationships and its aim is to protect
and maintain reciprocal altruism and to restore equity (Trivers,
1971; Baumeister et al., 1994).
Even if both approaches describe guilt as a unique feeling,
it is clear that they show important contrasting elements
both on the level of motivation and on action tendencies.
In particular, the psychoanalytic approach focuses on the fear
of punishment (Tomkins, 1963; Mosher, 1965; Lewis, 1971),
which should induce avoidant behavior. In contrast, according
to the interpersonal approach, guilt should promote altruistic
tendencies as well as a closeness to the putative “victim.” The
question therefore is the following: is guilt a single emotion that
activates contrasting behavioral outcomes depending on diﬀerent
situational variables, or are we to consider the existence of two
distinct senses of guilt? (Carnì et al., 2013).
A recent attempt has been made (Mancini, 2008) to integrate
these two perspective in a comprehensive model. According to
this approach the intrapsychic and interpersonal models are
not mutually exclusive if we consider the existence of two
independent emotions, namely deontological guilt (DG) and
AG. The word independent here signals that although these two
kinds of guilt can be (and often are) experienced at the same
time, they can be conceptually distinguishable with reference
to appraisal theories of emotion, according to which speciﬁc
cognitions are important antecedents of speciﬁc emotions and
thereby of speciﬁc action tendencies (Smith and Ellsworth, 1985;
Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 1987, 1992; Frijda et al., 1989; Scherer,
1999, 2001). In particular, in AG there is always a victim that
suﬀers harm and the appraisal of not having been altruistic, but
there may not have been any violation of moral rules (Baumeister
et al., 1994). In DG, on the contrary, there might not have
been a victim at all and the appraisal of having violated an
intuitive moral rule is necessary and suﬃcient (Mancini, 2008;
Gangemi and Mancini, 2011). Therefore, the two feelings are
not just triggered by diﬀerent types of events, but diﬀer only in
virtue of the appraisal of the event in the context of individual
goals (Carnì et al., 2013). In particular, DG emerges from the
appraisal of having disobeyed moral authority, or a deontological
norm such as “Do not play God.” According to this norm, no
one has the right to make a decision that does not respect
the limits of his/her social rank or function (Sunstein, 2005).
Therefore, the model predicts feelings of unworthiness and the
expectation, or fear, of a punishment (Mancini, 2008; Gangemi
andMancini, 2011). Punishment is an essential ingredient for this
type of guilt because, through the punishment of the transgressor,
rank diﬀerences between him/her and authority are restored
(Mancini, 2008). AG appears when one appraises his/her own
conduct as not altruistic. The emotional state is connected to
empathy, sorrow, and compassion for the victim. According to
the model, AG should imply behavioral tendencies aimed at
minimizing the number of victims, alleviating their suﬀering
and restoring equity (Baumeister et al., 1995; Ketelaar and
Au, 2003; Kubany and Watson, 2003). Indeed its evolutionary
function is to maintain, reinforce and protect social relationships
through the development of an empathic preoccupation for
the well-being of others, especially loved ones (Hoﬀman,
1982, 1998; Baumeister et al., 1994; Tangney and Dearing,
2002).
Recent empirical studies have tested the predictive power of
this model, showing that it is possible to separately induce AG
and DG by using facial expressions combined with the internal
dialog typically connected with each guilt feeling (Basile and
Mancini, 2011). Moreover, neuroscientiﬁc results revealed that
diﬀerent neuronal networks are involved in each kind of guilt,
with the insula selectively responding to DG stimuli (Basile
et al., 2010). It is known that the insula is activated when self-
reproach and disgust are experienced (e.g., Rozin et al., 2000),
thus the selective activation of the insula could reﬂect the major
involvement of self-reproach and self-loathing characterizing DG
more than AG (Rozin et al., 2000; Basile et al., 2010). Therefore,
another diﬀerence concerning the two kinds of guilt might rely on
the extent to which the two emotions aﬀect self-worth. However,
only a few studies have empirically tested whether and how
AG and DG independently aﬀect decision making (D’Olimpio
and Mancini, 2014; Mancini and Gangemi, 2015) and none
have compared a contingent enhancement of self-worth. Thus,
the current study aims at disclosing how healthy participants,
induced with either AG or DG, perform on a decision-making
task. If DG – but not AG – decreases participants’ self-worth,
only the former should prevent participants from performing any
behavior that could threaten the “Do not play God” principle.
To disclose the diﬀerence between AG and DG with respect
to self-worth, we contrasted the induction of the two guilt
feelings with that of pride in a third group of participants.
Trivially, DG and pride are antithetic with respect to self-
worth, which is diminished by the former and inﬂated by the
latter.
In the present study we used a modiﬁed version of the
Ultimatum Game (UG). In the classical one-shot version of
the UG (Güth et al., 1982) two players must divide a given
amount of money (e.g., €10). One player proposes how to
split the money by making an oﬀer. If the responder accepts,
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the money is divided according to the original oﬀer; if he/she
rejects, both players receive nothing. According to standard
economic models, in order to maximize his/her own payoﬀ the
responder should accept any oﬀer. Indeed, although inequitable,
any oﬀer is better than nothing. However, in accordance with
the theories of reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971) and inequity
aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), participants systematically
reject unfair oﬀers below 20–30% of the total pot (Nowak,
2000; Camerer, 2003), preferring to gain nothing rather
than accepting an unequal distribution of resources (Fehr
and Camerer, 2007). This type of behavior is also known
as altruistic punishment, because it is aimed at preventing
selﬁsh free riders from adopting a similar behavior with
a member of the same social group (Fehr and Gächter,
2002).
To measure how altruistic tendencies and aversion to break
deontological norms diﬀerently aﬀect decision making we
expanded on previous studies in behavioral economics, which
used economic games as experimental settings. In particular, the
UG has been repeatedly used to examine fairness perception,
prosocial motives and responses to unfairness (Camerer and
Fehr, 2004; Sanfey, 2007), also under the eﬀect of several
negative emotions such as anger (Andrade and Ariely, 2009),
sadness (Harlé and Sanfey, 2007), and disgust (Moretti and di
Pellegrino, 2010). Additionally, the link between self-conscious
emotions such as guilt (Ketelaar, 2004, 2005; de Hooge et al.,
2007; Nelissen et al., 2007) or shame (de Hooge et al., 2008)
and prosocial-behavior was extensively investigated by means of
repeated games (e.g., the public good game, see Ketelaar and
Au, 2003). While on the one hand previous literature provides
a useful basis for comparison to our results, on the other
hand it has failed to consider guilt not only in interpersonal
terms but also in deontological terms. For this reason in the
present study we used the third-party version of the UG. In this
version participants must decide to accept or reject the oﬀers on
behalf of a third party (Civai et al., 2010; Corradi-Dell’Acqua
et al., 2013). Recently it has been demonstrated that although
physiological indexes of arousal were lower when participants
played on behalf of a third party, they kept rejecting unfair oﬀers
(Civai et al., 2010). Hence, this version of the UG represents
a valid method to investigate participants’ equity motives not
just on an interpersonal axis, which contrasts selﬁshness and
altruism but on an axis which allows for investigating the human
tendency to stick to deontological norms beyond one’s own
payoﬀ.
On the basis of the described model (Mancini, 2008) we
made two main predictions. The model implies a reduction
of self-worth following DG but not AG induction. Therefore
our ﬁrst prediction was that deontological individuals (but not
altruistic ones) will present a higher acceptance rate of unfair
oﬀers as compared to proud individuals, pursuing the aim of
not interfering with the natural course of events and following
the “Do not play God” principle. Secondly, if equity motives
drive altruistic participants’ behavior, we should observe a higher
amount of altruistic punishment in this group as compared to
deontological participants (i.e., a lower acceptance rate of unfair
oﬀers).
Materials and Methods
Participants
A sample of 75 healthy participants volunteered for the study
(F = 62;Mean age= 31.75 (±7); age range= 26–49). Participants
were postgraduate students in their ﬁrst year of the school for
cognitive therapy (SPC) program in Rome. They were naive to the
purposes of the study. Each participant was randomly assigned
to one of three experimental groups: (i) DG induction (n = 25);
(ii) AG induction (n = 25) and (iii) pride induction (n = 25).
Informed consent was obtained from each participant before
the experimental phase. Each participant was provided with an
envelope containing a demographic questionnaire investigating
age, sex, marital status, education level, and two questions
assessing the presence of a neurological disorder, a psychiatric
diagnosis and present or past use of psychiatric drugs. None of the
participants reported neurological or psychiatric disorders or the
use of psychiatric drugs. The experimental protocol was approved
by the local scientiﬁc committee of SPC and was performed in
accordance with the ethical standards of the 1964 Declaration of
Helsinki.
Procedure
Participants were tested in groups, during three separate
sessions (i.e., one for each group). The experimenter informed
participants that they were going to perform a paper and pencil
questionnaire about emotions in everyday life. The paper and
pencil procedure has been used in previous studies diﬀerentiating
self-conscious emotions such as shame, guilt (Smith et al.,
2002), and embarrassment (Tangney et al., 1996). Moreover
group administration has been proven to be eﬀective in the
induction of guilt in general (Smith et al., 2002) and in the
independent induction of AG and DG (Basile and Mancini,
2011). The experimenter instructed participants to remain silent
for the entire duration of the experiment and to avoid any
interaction. Participants ﬁlled in 9 Visual Analog Scales (VAS) to
assess baseline mood. Once all participants completed the VAS,
the emotion induction phase began. Right after the induction,
participants were asked to again assess their mood on the same
type of VAS. Finally, participants were provided with the Third-
Party Ultimatum Game Questionnaire, which was created ad hoc.
At the end of the experimental session participants were fully
debriefed on the purposes of the study.
Emotion Induction
Altruistic guilt and deontological guilt inductions consisted of
reading two stories evoking the corresponding emotion. The
stories were taken from a preliminary stage of research in a
previous study (D’Olimpio and Mancini, 2014). Speciﬁcally, they
were selected by independent judges from a series of personal
recalls provided by 120 undergraduate students. Participants
were instructed to begin reading at the same time and the
induction took place simultaneously for all of them. The group
procedure was also successfully adopted in a previous study,
in which DG and AG were independently induced (Basile and
Mancini, 2011). The order of the stories was randomized across
participants. To increase the power of the induction at the end of
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the stories participants were further asked to recall a life event in
which they had felt the same way, remembering their emotional
experience. For pride induction participants were asked to recall
a life event in which they felt proud of themselves remembering
their emotional experience and writing it down.
Emotion Induction Check
To assess the eﬀectiveness of induction procedures, before and
after the induction participants responded to several questions
investigating the intensity of their diﬀerent emotions. To conceal
our interest in speciﬁc aﬀective states, and in order to assess
putative emotional halo eﬀects, we included nine diﬀerent
emotions: shame, sadness, fear, disgust, anger, compassion, AG,
DG, and happiness. The nine VAS scales were built following
the appraisal theory of emotions, according to which speciﬁc
cognitions are important antecedents of speciﬁc emotions and
thereby of speciﬁc action tendencies (Smith and Ellsworth, 1985;
Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 1987, 1992; Frijda et al., 1989; Scherer,
1999, 2001). Therefore, each aﬀective state was identiﬁed by the
name (e.g., DG), the corresponding mental state represented by
an internal dialog sentence (e.g., “Oh God! What have I done!
How dare I!?”), and the corresponding action tendency (e.g.,
desire to repent, to confess, to ask for forgiveness). Participants
could rate the intensity of each emotion by making a mark with
their pen on a VAS scale measuring 11 cm, ranging from 0 (not at
all) to 100 (very much).
Third Party Ultimatum Game Questionnaire
Right after the emotion manipulation check, participants
were provided with six hypothetical dilemmas. Each dilemma
described a typical UG scenario in which two people must divide
a sum of money. One of the two characters was described as
the proposer and the other as the responder. Participants were
instructed to play on behalf of the responder. Here is an example
of the UG scenarios (translated from Italian):
Anna and Marco are brother and sister. They inherited a sum of
money from their grandparents. The only condition for inheritance
is that Anna must propose how to split the money. You have been
called upon to decide on behalf of Marco. If you accept the oﬀer
proposed by Anna, the money will be divided according to the oﬀer.
If you refuse neither Anna nor Marco will gain anything. Anna
made the following oﬀer: 60% Anna, 40% Marco.
Oﬀers were expressed as percentages of the total pot (i.e.,
90:10, 80:20, 70:30, 60:40, 50:50, and 40:60). Indeed, it has
been shown across various parameters and participant pools
that rejection behavior in the UG is independent from the
actual amount of money oﬀered, and rather more aﬀected by its
relative value (Camerer, 2003). Each dilemmawas associated with
two diﬀerent oﬀers. Therefore, each type of oﬀer was repeated
twice for a total of 12 responses. Participants could respond by
writing an A (acceptance) or an R (rejection) near each oﬀer.
Moreover, they could rate the fairness of the oﬀer on a VAS scale
ranging from 0 (not at all fair) to 100 (very fair). The order
of the dilemmas and that of the oﬀers was randomized across
participants.
Data Analysis
A research assistant, who was blinded to the purpose of the study,
coded all paper data. Since our data were not normally distributed
across groups, as assessed by Shapiro–Wilk’s test (all Ps < 0.05),
we employed non-parametric statistics.
Emotion Induction
For each subject VAS scores were measured in centimeters. To
assess emotion induction eﬀectiveness, pre and post induction
VAS scores for each emotion were compared using the Wilcoxon
signed-rank test in each of the three groups.
Furthermore, data coding revealed that eight participants
originally coded as deontological reported a higher increase in
AG intensity as compared to DG (+8.50, +9.70, +3.40, +2.90,
+2, +5.50, +8, +2, respectively), even if they received the
DG induction. Analogously, one participant originally coded as
altruistic and one participant originally coded as proud, reported
higher increase in DG scores as compared to the increase in
AG and pride (+1, +8, respectively). Therefore, groups were re-
coded accordingly and subsequent data analysis was performed
on the following groups: Deontological group (n= 19), Altruistic
group (n = 32) and Proud group (n = 24).
In order to assess the amount of change produced by the
induction with respect to the baseline, an index was obtained
by subtracting the pre-induction scores from the post-induction
scores. The obtained indexes for each emotion were then
compared between the three new groups, by means of the
Kruskal–Wallis H test. Where appropriate post hoc pairwise
comparisons were performed by means of the Mann–Whitney
U test with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons.
Adjusted p-values are reported for signiﬁcant comparisons.
Median Acceptance and Fairness Ratings
Oﬀers were grouped in Unfair (10:90 and 20:80), Moderately
Unfair (30:70 and 40:60), and Fair (50:50 and 60:40). A Kruskal–
Wallis H test was run to test for diﬀerences between the three
groups in the distribution of acceptance of each type of oﬀer (i.e.,
10, 20, 30, 40, 50, and 60%). Where appropriate post hoc pairwise
comparisons were performed by means of the Mann–Whitney
U test with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons.
Adjusted p-values are reported for signiﬁcant comparisons. The
same type of analysis was performed on fairness ratings.
Additionally, six cumulative odds ordinal logistic regressions
with proportional odds were run to determine the eﬀect of the
post induction modulation of each of the nine emotions (shame,
sadness, fear, disgust, anger, compassion, AG, DG, happiness) on
each type of oﬀer (i.e., 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, and 60%). Signiﬁcant
results were adjusted by means of the Bonferroni correction.
Where appropriate adjusted p-values are presented.
Results
Induction Check
As shown in Table 1, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, run on
the original groups, those with 25 participants exposed to the
three conditions, determined that the median post-induction
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TABLE 1 | Pre and Post induction scores for each group, Wilcoxon Z and
significance levels (∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001).
Deontologic Guilt
(DG) group
Med. Pre Med. Post Z(24) p
Shame 0 2.5 4.166 0.00031∗∗∗
Sadness 0 2.2 3.485 0.000491∗ ∗∗
Fear 0 5.2 3.845 0.000120∗ ∗∗
Disgust 0 0.4 3.407 0.000655∗ ∗
Anger 0 0 1.765 0.077
Compassion 0 5.5 4.057 0.00005∗∗∗
Altruistic Guilt (AG) 0 5.1 3.847 0.00012∗∗∗
DG 0 5.20 3.919 0.00009∗∗∗
Happiness 4 0 3.562 0.00037∗∗∗
AG group Med. Pre Med. Post Z(24) p
Shame 0 0.9 0.958 0.338
Sadness 0.3 2.2 2.165 0.030∗
Fear 1 0.8 2.532 0.011∗
Disgust 0 0.5 3.283 0.001∗∗∗
Anger 1 4.8 4.130 0.000036∗ ∗∗
Compassion 1.5 8 3.968 0.000072∗ ∗∗
AG 0.3 6 3.985 0.000067∗ ∗∗
DG 0.2 0.30 1.111 0.266
Happiness 7.2 0.1 4.210 0.000025∗ ∗∗
Proud group Med. Pre Med. Post Z(24) p
Shame 0 0 1.65 0.10
Sadness 1 0 2.187 0.028∗
Fear 0.4 0 1.111 0.266
Disgust 0 0 0.070 0.944
Anger 0 0 0.90 0.366
Compassion 0 0 1.725 0.084
AG 0 0 0.800 0.423
DG 0 0 1.070 0.284
Happiness 6 8.4 4.049 <0.00005∗∗∗
Target emotions in each group and their significance values are displayed in bold.
scores related to DG and AG were higher as compared to the
median pre-induction-scores in DG and AG groups, respectively.
Furthermore, the proud group showed a signiﬁcant increase in
happiness scores (all Ps< 0.0001). Proud participants’ recalls are
shown in Table 2.
The Kruskal–Wallis H test, run on the three newly coded
groups, revealed that the medians of the increase index scores
were statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between groups (Table 3).
Distributions of the increase indexes were similar for all groups,
as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot.
Mann–Whitney U test for pairwise comparisons revealed
that DG showed a higher increase in the deontological group
(Median = 8.5) with respect to the altruistic group (Median = 0,
Adj.p = 0.0003) and to the proud group (Median = 0,
Adj.p = 0.0003). No signiﬁcant diﬀerences were found between
the altruistic group and the proud group in the increase of DG
(p = 0.17, NS). Shame was increased to a higher extent in the
deontological group (Median = 0.9) as compared to the proud
group (Median = 0, Adj.p = 0.0003). No signiﬁcant diﬀerences
were found between the altruistic group and the proud group in
the increase of shame (p = 0.124, NS). Fear increased more in
the deontological group (Median = 1.8) than in the proud group
(Median = 0, Adj.p = 0.0003). Additionally fear increase was
higher in the altruistic group (Median = 1.1) as compared to the
proud group (Adj.p = 0.0003).
Altruistic guilt showed a higher increase in the
altruistic group (Median = 4.65) with respect to both
the deontological group (Median = 1.2, Adj.p = 0.021) and
the proud group (Median = 0, Adj.p = 0.0003). Additionally,
AG was higher in the deontological group with respect to the
proud group (Adj.p = 0.018). Compassion showed a higher
increase in the altruistic group (Median = 5.7) with respect to
both the deontological group (Median = 1.8, Adj.p = 0.042) and
the proud group (Median = 0, Adj.p = 0.0003). Additionally,
the deontological group showed a higher increase in compassion
scores than the proud group (Adj.p = 0.0003). Furthermore,
the increase in anger was higher in the altruistic group
(Median = 2.150) as compared to both the deontological group
(Median = 0, Adj.p= 0.0003) and the proud group (Median= 0,
Adj.p = 0.021). In addition the median anger increase was
not diﬀerent between the deontological and the proud group
(Adj.p = 0.153, NS).
Sadness showed a lower increase in the proud
group (Median = –0.50) with respect to both
the deontological group (Median = 1.9, Adj.p = 0.0003) and the
altruistic group (Median = 0.5, Adj.p = 0.0003). Disgust showed
a lower increase in the proud group (Median = 0) with respect
to both the deontological group (Median = 5, Adj.p = 0.0003)
and the altruistic group (Median = 0.5, Adj.p = 0.009). The
median increase in shame, disgust, fear and sadness were not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the deontological group and the
altruistic group (all Ps> 0.103).
Finally happiness increased to a higher extent in the
proud group (Median = 4.95) both with respect to
the deontological group (Median = –24, Adj.p = 0.0003)
and to the altruistic group (Median = –6.45, Adj.p = 0.0003).
Additionally, median happiness increase index was lower in the
altruistic group than in the deontological group (Adj.p = 0.036).
Diﬀerences in median values for each emotion between groups
are represented in Figure 1.
Median Acceptances between Groups
Figure 2 illustrates median acceptances as a function of the UG
oﬀers and emotion condition.
The distributions of acceptance had a similar shape for
all groups, as assessed by visual inspection of the boxplots.
The Kruskal–Wallis H test showed that for Moderately Unfair
oﬀers, median acceptance was statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
between groups, [χ2(2) = 7.567, p = 0.023]. The Mann–
Whitney U test for pairwise comparisons revealed that median
acceptance for the deontological group was higher than that
of the proud group (Adj.p = 0.027; Figure 2A). Neither the
comparison between the altruistic group and the proud group,
nor that between the deontological group and the altruistic
group were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (p = 0.130, and p = 0.096,
respectively). Moreover, for Fair oﬀers, median acceptance values
were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between groups, [χ2(2) = 6.385,
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TABLE 2 | The Table reports pride episodes recalled by the 25 participants in the original proud group.
Pride Stories
1 I was proud of myself when during my third year at University I have done everything I could not to lose a scholarship. I passed many exams in a few days. This
allowed me to pay for my studies and not to weigh on my family.
2 I was proud of myself when I gave a lecture about communication techniques. Participants showed interest, asking many questions and requested an
additional class.
3 Two weeks ago I quit a job that was recently causing me physical and psychological suffering. A disgusting job, against my personal values. I had the strength
to say “Enough!” I saved myself.
4 I was proud of myself when I was offered a job in the place where I had done an internship. I was very proud because I was chosen for my abilities and not for
some kind of connection.
5 Last Thursday I went to the retirement home where I work as a volunteer. I prepared a CD with old songs to entertain the elderlies. They were all very happy:
they sang and danced. I felt happy and satisfied because I was cheering up their day and I was gaining consideration and success from that. Doing something
for the elderlies made me happy!
6 To be able to follow a diet and lose the weight that I had planned: pride and a sense of power and control.
7 Some years ago I took a carrier path that seemed profitable and in line with my studies and interests. I completed a work that made me proud. With time the
opportunities connected with this job have downsized but what remains is a sense of “know how” that still makes me proud.
8 I offered a patient a free therapy session because she had financial difficulties.
9 I felt proud last time I made the right diagnosis.
10 I was proud listening the recording of my radio program. Although I am not a professional the program has many followers.
11 The first time in Rome with my wife. Driving through the city at night and realizing that I made a dream come true.
12 During therapy I was able to cooperate with a patient who was very resistant. She shared her realty with me. I was satisfied for having done a good job.
13 My graduation day: a feeling of pride and happiness that I shared with friends and family.
14 During a meeting at work I gave a speech that was appreciated both by my boss and by the rest of the team.
15 I received praise and gratitude for a voluntary work.
16 Some weeks ago I arranged a meeting between two of my friends who barely talked to each other. When the two met they hugged themselves crying. I felt
proud of myself, because thanks to me my two friends talked, and solved their problem.
17 After several disappointing years, I gave my first lecture in a research center obtaining a discrete amount of success. The feeling of compensation for all my
efforts and the signs of appreciation from the audience gave me real joy and made me proud.
18 When I signed a job contract. I was very happy and proud of myself.
19 Today the husband of a patient thanked me because I treated his wife not only professionally but also with kindness. The patient had a threat of miscarriage
after three miscarriages. I felt proud not only for his acknowledgment but especially because I was able to combine, in treating that patient, both technique and
kindness.
20 A few months ago the head of the department where I work gave me the responsibility to develop a research proposal that, if approved, would have brought
funding to the whole department. After I sent him the project proposal he came looking for me to congratulate for having done a good job. I felt very proud of
myself, and I felt my commitment to be acknowledged.
21 When I graduated I felt proud and satisfied. Although I made many sacrifices, I achieved one of my goals and I felt happy and impatient to start working
22 When I graduated. I felt happiness, satisfaction, a sense of achievement and self-efficacy.
23 I was proud for having done a good job with a child in therapy.
24 I felt proud of myself when during a therapy session the patient told me that he was feeling better and that the work I had done was helpful.
25 The first time I took an airplane it was for an 11 h flight. Although I was a little scared, I felt very proud.
p = 0.041]. The Mann–Whitney U test for pairwise comparisons
revealed that median acceptance of the altruistic group was
higher than that of the proud group (Adj.p = 0.042; Figure 2B).
Neither the comparison between the deontological group and
the proud group, nor that between the deontological group and
the altruistic group were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (p = 0.144 and
p= 0.337, respectively). For Unfair oﬀers median acceptance was
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between groups (p> 0.922).
Fairness Ratings
The Kruskal–Wallis H test on fairness ratings scores showed no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between groups for all the three types of
oﬀers (all Ps> 0.285).
Ordinal Regression
The only ordinal regression model found to be signiﬁcant
was for 30% oﬀers. The assumption of proportional odds was
TABLE 3 | Kruskal–Wallis H test results for each emotion, with χ2 values
and asymptotic significance (two-sided test).
Emotion χ2(2) Asympt. p
Shame 14.080 0.001
Sadness 18.617 0.000
Fear 17.091 0.000
Disgust 19.254 0.000
Anger 18.745 0.000
Compassion 34.122 0.000
AG 30.774 0.000
DG 31.964 0.000
Happiness 43.344 0.000
met, as assessed by a full likelihood ratio test comparing the
residual of the ﬁtted location model to a model with varying
location parameters, [χ2(9) = 13.266, p = 0.151]. The deviance
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FIGURE 1 | The figure shows the median increase of each emotion after
the induction for the deontological group (white bars), altruistic group
(gray bars) and proud group (black bars). (A) The emotions presenting a
higher median increase in the deontological group than in the proud group
[namely deontologic guilt (DG), shame and fear]. (B) The emotions that
presented a higher median increase in the altruistic group with respect to both
the deontological and the proud group [namely altruistic guilt (AG), compassion
and anger]. (C) The emotions presenting similar increase in the AG and DG
group and happiness scores (which showed a higher decrease in the AG group
with respect to the other two groups.
goodness-of-ﬁt test indicated that the model was a good ﬁt
for the observed data, [χ2(139) = 135.165, p = 0.576], but
most cells were sparse with zero frequencies in 66.7% of cells.
However, the ﬁnal model statistically signiﬁcantly predicted
the dependent variable over and above the intercept-only
model, [χ2(9) = 135.165, p = 0.011]. A higher increase in
DG was associated with an increase in the odds of accepting
30% oﬀers, with an odds ratio of 1.466 (95% CI [1.166 to
1.843]), [Wald χ2(1) = 10.717, Adj.p = 0.009; Figure 3A].
The increase indexes of other emotions were not signiﬁcantly
associated with participants’ responses to 30% oﬀers (all
Ps> 0.13).
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Median acceptance of Moderately Unfair offers presented by
the deontological group (white bar), the altruistic group (gray bar), and the
pride group (black bar). (B) Median acceptance of Fair offers presented by the
deontological group (white bar), the altruistic group (gray bar), and the proud
group (black bar).
For 60% oﬀers the deviance goodness-of-ﬁt test indicated
that the model was a good ﬁt for the observed data,
[χ2(139) = 115.055, p = 0.932], but most cells were sparse with
zero frequencies in 66.7% of cells. However, the ability of the
model to predict the dependent variable over and above the
intercept-only model approached signiﬁcance, [χ2(9) = 16.395,
p = 0.059]. A higher decrease in happiness levels was associated
with an increase in the odds of accepting 60% oﬀers, with an odds
ratio of 0.845 (95% CI [0.750 to 0.951], [Wald χ2(1) = 7.747,
Adj.p = 0.045]. The assumption of proportional odds was met,
as assessed by a full likelihood ratio test comparing the residual
of the ﬁtted location model to a model with varying location
parameters, [χ2(9) = 14.736, p= 0.098; Figure 3B]. The increase
indexes of other emotions were not signiﬁcantly associated with
participants’ responses to 60% oﬀers (all Ps> 0.14).
Discussion
Our results showed that the induction was eﬀective in
enhancing baseline levels of the targeted emotion in each
group. DG scores were higher in the deontological group
as compared to the altruistic and the proud groups. However,
eight participants originally coded as deontological presented
a higher enhancement of AG as compared to DG and one
participant originally coded as altruistic presented a higher
enhancement of DG. It might be that the scenarios described in
some of the stories used for the DG induction also elicited in
some participants altruistic and empathic feelings (as accounted
for by post-induction compassion scores, which were strongly
enhanced in the original DG group). It is worth noting that
previous experiments combined the use of internal dialog
sentences with the exposure to emotional facial expressions
(Basile and Mancini, 2011). This latter method might be more
eﬀective to separately induce the two types of guilt.
Data analysis performed on the increase indexes of the
newly coded groups revealed that the enhancement in AG was
accompanied by an increase in anger and compassion scores,
which were greater in the AG group with respect to the other
two groups. Additionally, the AG group presented a signiﬁcantly
higher decrease in happiness scores as compared to the other
two groups. Similar emotional “halo eﬀects” were also found
in previous studies (see Basile and Mancini, 2011 relative to
compassion and sadness, and D’Olimpio and Mancini, 2014
relative to anger). These eﬀects were consistent with the goal
of AG, which is to promote pro-social and reparative behaviors
toward the victim and feeling sorry for her/him (Mancini, 2008;
Basile and Mancini, 2011).
The main purpose of our research was to determine whether
and how diﬀerent guilt feelings, namely the deontological type
and the altruistic type, diﬀerently aﬀected decision making,
as compared to pride in a third party version of the UG.
In accordance with our ﬁrst prediction, results showed that
participants induced with DG accepted Moderately Unfair oﬀers
to a higher extent as compared to proud participants. This
result can be explained by the opposite eﬀect that DG and
pride exert on self-worth. Indeed, recent accounts posited
that factors others than immediate emotional reaction, such
as the judgments directed toward the self, inﬂuence decision
making in the UG (Dunn et al., 2010). Speciﬁcally, high trait
positivity (i.e., the tendency to experience positive emotions
rather than negative) was related to a higher rejection rate
of unfair oﬀers, while high trait negativity was related to the
acceptance of such oﬀers. Interestingly, the relationship between
positive and negative trait levels and the levels of rejection
of unfair oﬀers was not mediated by contextual variations in
participants’ mood. Therefore, the authors hypothesized that
they were rather mediated by self-worth, with those of a
positive disposition believing to be “worth more than that”
and those of a negative disposition resigning themselves to
“take the crumbs from under the table” (Dunn et al., 2010).
Consistently, it was shown that high levels of disgust toward
the self-strongly modulated moral judgments of others’ behavior.
In particular, individuals with high traits of self-loathing judged
strict moral transgressions (e.g., murder) as less disgusting
and punishment deserving, as compared to participants with
low self-loathing traits (Olatunji et al., 2012). Recent evidence
has shown that AG and DG activate diﬀerent brain networks.
Speciﬁcally, while AG was associated with activity in medial
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FIGURE 3 | (A) The number of times participants accepted 30:70 offers (i.e.,
0;1;2, X-axis) as a function of the increase in deontological guilt (Y-axis). Each
participant is identified as deontological (white circles), altruistic (gray circles), or
proud (black circles). (B) The number of times participants accepted 60:40
offers (i.e., 0;1;2, X-axis) as a function of the decrease in happiness (Y-axis).
Each participant is identified as deontological (white circles), altruistic (gray
circles), or proud (black circles). Spearman Rho correlation coefficients and their
relative p-values are reported above each panel.
prefrontal areas, consistently associated with theory of mind,
empathy, and compassion (Blair, 1995; Shallice, 2001; Moll et al.,
2006), DG activated the anterior cingulate cortex and insula,
previously associated with self-reproach and disgust (Rozin et al.,
2000).
An alternative explanation could be that since the induction
of DG produced an increase in several other negative emotions,
the increase in one of these or the general negativity of the
aﬀect experienced by deontological participants could have
been predictive of their behavior in the UG. However, this
interpretation seems to be disconﬁrmed by the results of the
ordinal regression model, which showed only the increase of DG
to be predictive of 30:70 oﬀers median acceptance. In addition,
fairness ratings were not diﬀerent across groups, indicating
that the higher acceptance rate of Moderately Unfair oﬀers
exhibited by deontological participants did not depend on a
decreased ability to judge others’ behavior. According to the
principle of “Do not play God” no one has the right to make
a decision that does not respect the limits of his/her social
rank or function (Sunstein, 2005). Therefore the adoption of
this principle should induce a humble attitude, which results
in the limitation of decisional autonomy (Mancini, 2008).
Previous accounts have shown that DG and AG diﬀerently
aﬀect moral decision-making (Mancini and Gangemi, 2015).
Speciﬁcally, participants induced with DG preferred inaction
when faced with the switch version of the trolley dilemma,
while those induced with AG preferred action (Mancini and
Gangemi, 2015). Crucially, deontological participants justiﬁed
their omission bias with the goal of not interfering with
the natural order, or in other words, with the “Do not
play God” principle (Gangemi and Mancini, 2013). Moreover,
the presence of an authority limited participants’ decision-
making autonomy activating the “Do not play God” principle
and led them to prefer inaction (Gangemi and Mancini,
2013).
According to our second prediction, the induction of altruistic
motives should have brought about a lower acceptance rate of
unfair oﬀers in AG participants as compared to DG participants.
This would have also been consistent with the high scores of
anger and the lower scores of happiness presented in the AG
group with respect to the other two groups. Indeed, both angry
and sad participants were signiﬁcantly more likely to reject
unfair oﬀers in the classical version of the UG (Harlé and
Sanfey, 2007; Andrade and Ariely, 2009). Contrastingly, altruistic
participants’ median acceptance of Moderately Unfair oﬀers was
not signiﬁcantly lower than that of deontological participants, nor
was it higher than proud participants. One possible interpretation
of this null result is that participants in the AG condition
were somewhat divided between equity motives and the use of
a utilitarian strategy, reﬂecting the aim of minimizing losses.
Indeed, altruistic participants adopted a utilitarian strategy when
faced with the switch version of the trolley moral dilemma
(Mancini and Gangemi, 2015), choosing to “cause” the death of
three people in order to save ﬁve others. Crucially, participants
preferring the action tended to justify it by referring to the
altruistic principle that prescribes minimizing other’s suﬀering
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(for example: “it’s better that three people die instead of ﬁve”).
However, when faced with 60:40 oﬀers, which are unbalanced
in favor of the receiver, altruistic participants presented a higher
median acceptance with respect to proud participants. The results
of the ordinal regression suggest that these types of acceptances
are compensatory, since 60:40 acceptances tended to be predicted
by a decrease in happiness levels, lower in those who accepted
these oﬀers more frequently.
It is noteworthy that participants did not beneﬁt economically
from accepting the oﬀers, since they were playing on behalf of a
third party. According to social preference theory, people prefer
to behave pro-socially because they derive higher hedonic value
frommutual cooperation and altruism (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959;
Fehr, 2008). Thus, it is widely held that the brain uses a common-
reward metric for the processing of both individual and social
rewards (Sanfey, 2007). Speciﬁcally, an increased activation of
the ventral tegmental and striatal areas was found both when
receiving money and in non-costly charitable donations (Moll
et al., 2006; Harbaugh et al., 2007).
Conclusion
In sum, while DG leads to a higher acceptance rate of Moderately
Unfair oﬀers as compared to pride, AG does not show the
same eﬀect. We hypothesize that this occurs because proud
participants feel entitled enough to take action in order to restore
equity, while deontological participants are prone to take a
humble attitude, which does not allow them to decide on behalf
of others. AG instead may not entail a change in perceived
hierarchy and possible utilitarian motives are not intense enough
to produce any behavioral diﬀerence with proud participants
in the acceptance of Moderately Unfair oﬀers. However, in the
present study self-worth was not directly estimated. This is a
limitation of our results and future studies should directly assess
the eﬀect of AG and DG on self-worth and perceived moral
hierarchy.
The distinction between AG and DG is important in light of
the role played by guilt in obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD).
Recent ﬁndings have shown that DG and not AG is the mental
state underlying checking and cleaning compulsions (D’Olimpio
and Mancini, 2014). Additionally, fMRI results have revealed
an abnormal processing of DG (but not AG) in OCD patients
(Basile et al., 2013). Finally, when faced with moral dilemmas,
OCD patients – but not anxious patients – preferred omission,
presumably in order to respect the of “Do not play God” principle
(Mancini and Gangemi, 2015).
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